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SIGNALING, LEGITIMACY, AND COMPLIANCE: A
COMMENT ON POSNER'S LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS
AND CRIMINAL LAW POLICY
Tracey L. Meares*

I. INTRODUCTION

Although criminal law can be justified with respect to nonutilitarian goals such as retribution, no one can deny that one
way to justify criminal law is with respect to the instrumental
ends of deterrence. So, one question of interest to scholars in the
field has been how to think about the kinds of criminal law policy
that encourage compliance. My own work has focused on this important question. Specifically, I have been concerned with the
ways in which different kinds of criminal proscriptions, along
with certain methods of law enforcement, could affect crime rates
in disadvantaged, urban neighborhoods.' In undertaking such
analyses, I have emphasized classical sociological theory and social psychology, often for the purpose of criticizing economic approaches to crime control, which have been interpreted to emphasize higher levels of severe punishments for conduct such as drug
offenses.2
Thus, as a student of criminology and psychology, and a sometime critic of economic approaches to criminal law policy, I ini* Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Studies in Criminal Justice, University of Chicago Law School; Research Fellow, American Bar Foundation. Sam Jordan
provided research assistance for this essay. Final support was provided by the Arnold and
Frieda Shure Research Fund at the University of Chicago and the American Bar Foundation. I also would like to express my gratitude to the editors of the University of Richmond
Law Review for their helpful editing.
1. See generally Tracey L. Meares, Norms, Legitimacy and Law Enforcement, 79 OR.
L. REv. 391 (2000) [hereinafter Meares, Norms]; Tracey L. Meares, Place and Crime, 73
Cmi.-KENT L. REV. 669 (1998) [hereinafter Meares, Place and Crime]; Tracey L. Meares,
Social Organizationand DrugLaw Enforcement, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 191 (1998).
2. See generally Meares, Norms, supra note 1; Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan,
Law and (Norms of) Order in the Inner City, 32 LAw & Soc'y REV. 805 (1998).
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tially imagined that this commentary would be a sharp critique of
Eric Posner's Law and Social Norms3 as it applies to topics I have
mined in past work. In his book, Posner attempts to boil down a
wide variety of human actions to their bare essentials.4 The engine of the book is a general model of nonlegal cooperation, which
Posner describes as a signaling game.5 Because people desire to
cooperate with one another, they engage in regular but costly
sorts of behaviors in order to communicate to each other that they
are good partners for cooperation.6 Posner calls these behavioral
regularities "norms,"7 and he uses this general model to comment
on everything from family law to voting to criminal law.' Thus,
Posner explains that observance of criminal law-which could be
costly to compliant individuals-is a function of the fact that people "are likely to obtain future returns when others see them
obeying a legitimate law."9
Compliance, then, can be explained by the signaling model, and
it is this spare explanation that I originally sought to resist. Certainly, I am not alone.1 ° After all, Posner claims at the outset of
his book that a recurrent objection to the theory is that "signaling
'can't be all that there is.""' While Posner admits that other disciplines might have something to say about the subjects he canvasses in his book, he nonetheless concludes that a fuller examination of such contributions "would muddy the exposition of the
argument without providing any offsetting benefits." 2
In this short essay, my goal is to make a few mud pies. But
they likely will be smaller than I originally had imagined. As will
soon be obvious, Posner's work and that of social psychologists
can be integrated fairly easily. I will first lay out the normative
theory of compliance with the law and compare it to Posner's approach. I will then review some of the themes concerning pun3.

ERIc A. POSNER, LAW AND SOcIAL NORMS (2000).

4. See id. at 7-8.
5. See id. at 18-27.
6. See id. at 5, 111.
7. Id. at5.
8. See id. at 68-87 (discussing family law); id. at 112-32 (discussing voting and other
political participation); id. at 88-111 (discussing criminal law).
9. Id. at 111.
10. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates: Law, Norms, and Economic Methodology, 110 YALE L.J. 625 (2001) (reviewing POSNER, supra note 3).
11. POSNER, supranote 3, at 46.
12. Id.
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ishment that Posner covers in chapter six. This review will reveal
the affinity between the signaling model and normative theories
of compliance. It will also demonstrate, however, that in certain
circumstances the signaling theory is incomplete. Where the theory is incomplete, I will argue, it is necessary to resort to other
disciplines for a more satisfactory explanation of behavior and for
the purpose of engineering good policy.

II. WHY Do PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW?
The standard economic explanation of why people obey the law
focuses on deterrence. People will shape their behavior, the argument goes, in response to the likelihood that they will be subject to the formal sanctions that flow from violations of the law. 3
This theory illustrates the view of compliance as instrumental. 4
That is, compliance is based on the assumption that people obey
the law because they fear the consequences of failing to do so. 5
In contrast, social psychologists have connected voluntary compliance with the law to the fact that individuals believe the law is
"just," or because they believe that the authority enforcing the
law has the right to do so. 6 Psychologists designate these reasons
for compliance as normative as opposed to instrumental. 7 Normative factors cause individuals to respond differently than they
would respond to rewards and punishments.' While some individuals comply with the law in response to externally imposed
punishments, individuals who comply for normative reasons do so
because they feel an internal obligation to do so.' Hence, "the
suggestion that citizens will voluntarily act against their selfinterest is the key to the social value of normative influences." °

13. See generally JEREuy BENTHAi, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS
AND LEGISLATION (J.H. Burns & H.L-.A Hart eds., Athlone Press 1970) (1789) (providing

the classic explanation of the relationship between morals and the law); Dan M. Kahan,
SocialInfluence, Social Meaning,and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349 (1997).
14. See Meares, Norms, supra note 1, at 398.
15. See id.
16. See POSNER, supra note 3, at 110-11; TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW
3 (1990).

17. Meares, Norms, supra note 1, at 398-99.
18. Id. at 398.

19. See POSNER, supranote 3, at 111; Meares, Norms, supranote 1, at 398.
20. TYLER, supranote 16, at 24.
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Compliance may derive either from a belief that a law is just,
or from a belief that the governing body has the authority to
make law. In either case, compliance is normative.2 Psychologist
Tom Tyler refers to the former type of compliance as moralitybased, and the latter type as legitimacy-based.2 2 Research shows
that morality-based compliance is more powerful than legitimacybased compliance.2 3 While legitimacy may be less important to
compliance than morality, empirical work has shown that legitimacy is more important than instrumental factors such as formal
sanctions imposed on law-breakers.2 4
For example, Tyler has studied compliance using regression
analyses. Measuring the relative importance of factors such as
legitimacy, public deterrence, peer disapproval, and personal morality, Tyler concludes that the regression estimate for legitimacy
was five times higher than the estimate for deterrence.26 There
have been other studies exploring the relationship between legitimacy and compliance. Those researchers have found that legitimacy strongly impacts acceptance of arbitration awards,2 7 the
acceptance of business decisions, and compliance with rules in
business settings.2 8 These results do not suggest that instrumental factors are irrelevant to compliance. Rather, in each of these

21. Id. at 3-4. For a similar discussion of the following material regarding compliance,
see generally Meares, Norms, supra note 1.
22. TYLER, supra note 16, at 3-4.
23. Id. at 57-64. Regression analyses indicate that between deterrence, peer disapproval, personal morality, and legitimacy, personal morality is most strongly correlated
with compliance. Id. at 59.
24. See id. at 57-60.
25. See id. at 57-64.
26. The study found the regression estimates to be 0.11 for legitimacy and 0.02 (not
significant) for deterrence. Id. at 59 tbl.5.1. Both of these estimates were adjusted with a
beta constant for reliability. Id. To put these estimates in perspective, note that the estimates for the impact of age and sex on compliance are 0.24 and 0.26, respectively. Id.
27. See E. ALLAN LIND ET AL., OUTCOME AND PROCESS CONCERNS IN ORGANIZATIONAL
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 22, 29 (Am. Bar Found., Working Paper No. 9109, 1991) (concluding
that the decisions of parties to accept or reject arbitration awards were more closely related to process concerns than to outcome concerns); ROBERT J. MACCOUN ET AL.,
ALTERNATIVE ADJUDICATION: AN EVALUATION OF THE NEW JERSEY AUTOMOBILE
ARBITRATION PROGRAM 60-62 (1988) (finding that the probability of litigants in cases involving automobile claims in New Jersey courts accepting arbitrators' awards correlated
with legitimacy and outcome favorability).
28. See Tom R. Tyler & R. Schuller, A Relational Model of Authority in Work Organizations: The Psychology of Procedural Justice (1990) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author) (stating that procedural justice was the most consistent predictor of decision
acceptance, rule following, turnover intention and grievance filing).
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studies, factors such as deterrence and outcome-based judgment
influenced compliance in some way. Research indicates that legitimacy is equally or more important to compliance than are instrumental factors.
In Law and Social Norms, Posner attempts to reconcile the
economic, social, and psychological models of compliance. Noting
that the normative view of compliance holds that individuals obey
a law even when they disagree with it-suggesting that under a
rational choice model their utility would be greater if they broke
the law-Posner claims that signaling easily brings the two approaches together. 29 Recall that people signal to each other by engaging in costly actions. ° Since the normative model implies that
people obey the law even when they do not want to, then obedience can be an important signal to others that one cares about delaying instant gratification and thus communicating one's "low
discount rate."3 ' According to Posner, this will only be true if most
people agree that the law to be obeyed has legitimacy. 2 Therefore, if a law has legitimacy, people will obey it because they are
likely3 to obtain future returns when others see them obeying that
3

law.

While the definition of legitimacy to which Posner has subscribed in making this statement is not entirely clear, his account
does have some affinity with the social psychology that underlies
normative theories of compliance. 34 For example, one model of social psychology measures legitimacy as a function of maximizing
self-interest. The theory suggests that individuals regard the
law as legitimate only when it serves their interests.36 Some psychologists have criticized the self-interest model because it fails to
account for legitimacy which persists despite repeated negative

29. POSNER, supranote 3, at 111.
30. Id. at 26.
31. Id. at 18. Posner defines people with low discount rates as those who value cooperation with others and the future payoffs that such relationships bring. Id. Those with
high discount rates are opportunistic, impulsive, and care little about future returns. Id.
32. Id. at 111.
33. Id.
34. For a more detailed explanation of the normative theory of compliance from the
social psychology perspective, see Meares, Norms, supra note 1, at 402-04.
35. Id. at 402. For a more thorough discussion of measuring legitimacy by maximizing
self-interest, see generally JOHN W. THIBAUT & HAROLD H. KELLEY, THE SocIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF GRouPs (1959).
36. Meares, Norms, supra note 1, at 402.
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outcomes under the law.37 Further, the model does not allow for
individuals who are very concerned about the fairness of the legal
process without regard to the results in any particular case.38
These critiques of the self-interest model suggest that a theory

based on norms rather than outcomes can account for more and
varied sources of legitimacy.3
To respond to the problems with the self-interest model, psychologists Allan Lind and Tom Tyler have developed the
"group value model."4 ° They argue that the legal process, in both
its formal and informal aspects, signals to members of a social
group how their group is perceived by governmental authorities.41
One strength of the group value model is that it defines legitimacy with respect to stable procedures-rather than more variable outcomes-which have greater potential to reinforce social
order.42 The theory, then, acknowledges that, while the optimal
outcome of any particular case may not be clear, the applicable
procedures should be apparent and, when uniformly applied, will
foster greater legitimacy.
Under the group value model, individuals may gauge how they
are perceived and treated by their government by three factors:
standing, neutrality, and trust.' "Standing" refers to an individual's membership in a social group.45 If the group is treated with
dignity and respect, the individuals are likely to conclude that the
authority recognizes their membership and status within the

group.46 "Neutrality" refers to the absence of bias or discrimination against the group and suggests that different groups will be

37. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE 228 (1988).
38. Id. at 229-30.
39. Meares, Norms, supranote 1, at 402.
40. LIND & TYLER, supra note 37, at 230-31.
41. Id. at 231.
42. Joel Brockner & Phyllis Siegel, Understandingthe InteractionBetween Procedural
and Distributive Justice: The Role of Trust, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS OF
THEORY AND RESEARCH 390, 404 (Roderick M. Kramer & Tom R. Tyler eds., 1996).
43. Meares, Norms, supra note 1, at 403.
44. Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A RelationalModel of Authority in Groups, in 25
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 115, 140 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1992).
45. Id. at 153; see Tom R. Tyler, What is ProceduralJustice?: CriteriaUsed by Citizens
to Assess the Fairnessof Legal Procedures,22 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 103, 129 (1988) (discussing the importance of "benevolence" and "sincerity" of leaders).
46. Tyler & Lind, supra note 44, at 153.
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treated alike.4' "Trust" is the individual's belief that the authority
will act not only fairly but also predictably in the future.' While
the researchers have identified these three factors as separate
elements of group value, they do not suggest that individuals do
the same.49 Rather, "most people simply lump all of these concerns together as they assess the overall quality of their relationship with an authority." °
A legitimacy-based law enforcement policy, then, should include both those who abide by the law and those who break the
law.5 ' The focus of such a policy is persuasion, more so than punishment.52 To implement such a policy, the authority must first
establish trust among the governed, which the group value model
suggests cannot be achieved by focusing on punishment.53 Compliance created by threats of punishment is fundamentally inconsistent with a relationship of trust and results in a rift, rather
than a bond, between the authority and the governed.54
Because the group value theory of procedural justice that lies
at the heart of the normative view of compliance is driven by the
human desire to connect with others, the normative approach is
clearly congenial to Posner's signaling model. Both models critique the standard economic explanation of compliance with
criminal law dictates. The normative view criticizes the economic
view for overemphasizing individual predilections to respond to
punishment rather than focusing on the message conveyed to the
punished person through the method of penalty imposition about
how she is perceived by government authorities.55 Posner complains that the standard economic approach is an impoverished
account of human behavior because it simply states that people
will be persuaded to refrain from lawbreaking if penalties are
high enough, and certain enough, without explaining how punishments persuade beyond the obvious point of the wealth reduc-

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 157-58.
Id. at 155.
Id. at 140 n.14.
Id. (emphasis added).
Meares, Norms, supra note 1, at 404.
Id.
Id.; Tyler & Lind, supranote 44, at 155-57.
Meares, Norms, supra note 1, at 404.
See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
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tion potential of fines and imprisonment.56 Posner says his signaling model provides an answer: People care about their reputa7
tions because reputations enable cooperative relationships.
Obedience enables one to signal his reputation as a "good type.""8
Because the foundations of the two models for compliance track
one another rather closely, one might predict that the models
would produce very similar conclusions about the problems of
punishment that Posner reviews. The following discussion will
demonstrate that the normative view and Posner's approach to
compliance do indeed produce similar conclusions with regard to
the propriety of shaming penalties and racial disproportion in
punishment, although for different reasons. Ultimately, however,
the signaling model is not as helpful for conceptualizing the
structure of criminal penalties as is the normative model.
III. SHAMING PENALTIES, STIGMA, AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF
CRIMINAL LAW

Posner finds currently popular shaming penalties (and, perhaps, imprisonment) problematic because his signaling model
suggests that people will have incentives to overinvest in shaming in order to demonstrate their own cooperativeness. 59 Since
joining with the government to enforce shaming penalties can be
such an effective signal of one's discount rate in some, but not all,
communities, shaming penalties imposed by the government can
lead to wildly variable punishments for different people, and, correspondingly, imposition of these penalties can result in wildly
variable levels of stigma being attached to different persons who
commit similar crimes.60 This state of affairs cannot be tolerated
in a world in which optimum deterrence is sought. Economic theory as applied to criminal law assumes that optimal sanctions are
those that are equal to the expected cost that the offender imposes divided by the probability of detection.6 ' If one subscribes to
this theory, and if one is convinced that government-supported

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

POSNER, supranote 3, at 111.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 18-19.
Id. at 92.
Id. at 95-96.

61.

See id. at 92.
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shaming penalties provide opportunities for third parties to signal, where the signaling creates arbitrarily severe punishments
that the government has no way to control, then one ought to conclude that shaming penalties should not be promoted over imprisonment.6 2
Note that the previous account is premised upon the notion of
optimal deterrence as it applies to criminal law policy. Should we
care about optimal deterrence in this arena, as opposed to, for instance, tort law? With respect to underdeterrence, the answer is
obviously yes. With respect to overdeterrence, one might conclude
that the concern is overwrought-at least according to a nonretributivist account of criminal punishment-since conduct designated as criminal is conduct that we all reasonably can conclude
has no social value.6 3 If there is no social value in criminal conduct, then there is no desirable level of such activity.6 4
Such a conclusion would be too hasty, however, because overdeterrence of one type of criminal conduct may well motivate an offender to substitute a different type of criminal conduct. George
Stigler has offered the classic example: if robbery and murder
both are punishable by the same ultimate penalty--death--then,
even if there are fewer robberies, robbers have little incentive to
refrain from killing their victims.6 5 Attention to the deep commitment people have to the formation of group relationships may
very well undermine, rather than support, non-incarcerative
shaming penalties.6 6
What does the normative view of compliance have to say about
shaming penalties? The normative approach focuses on the message conveyed to the individual punished about how he is viewed
by the state and the community in which he resides.6 7 According
to this view, the actual form of the penalty has some salience, but
the process through which the punishment is generated and con-

62. See id. at 94-96. Importantly, Posner does not conclude that the case against
shaming penalties is clear-cut. He states that their suitability can be assessed only after
empirical research. See id. at 97-98.
63. See Steven Shavell, CriminalLaw and the Optimal Use ofNonmonetary Sanctions
as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1234-35 (1985); George J. Stigler, The Optimum
Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 526 (1970).
64. See Shavell, supranote 63, at 1234-35.
65. See Stigler, supra note 63, at 527.
66. See POSNER, supra note 3, at 98-99.
67. See supratext accompanying notes 40-50.
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veyed to the defendant also matters a great deal.6" From the normative perspective, the primary problem with the kinds of punishments Posner describes-such as newspaper publication of the
names of those who seek prostitutes, or posting of signs in one's
yard such as "I'm an embezzler," 69 -is that they might not be imposed with enough indicia of procedural justice for the person
subjected to them to conclude that they are legitimate. °
Consider the procedural process entailed in a typical restorative justice sentencing circle. Restorative justice emphasizes the
relationship between the offender and the victim rather than the
relationship between the offender and the state. 71 Scholars of restorative justice innovations typically assert that these innovations provide crime victims with a more prominent role in the justice process than does the traditional justice system.72
Family group conferencing is one common restorative justice
approach. 3 Typically, a juvenile offender who admits wrongdoing
is referred by the court to a mediation process. 74 The mediator determines whether the offender and the victim are willing to meet
face-to-face and, if so, schedules a conference.75 The participants
in the conference typically include the young offender and his or
her family and supporters, the victim and his or her family and
supporters, a police officer, and a youth advocate. 76 Aside from
the youth advocate, lawyers are rarely present.77 The participants
68. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43, 51-53.
69. See POSNER, supranote 3, at 88-89.
70. See id. at 95-96.
71. See Mark S. Umbreit, Mediating Conflict Among Victims and Offenders, in
INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS IN OVERCROWDED TIMES 56, 56 (Michael Tonry & Kate Hamilton eds., 1995).
72. Id. at 57 (noting that victim-offender mediation programs give the victim a stake
in the process); see PETER MARSH & GILL CROW, FAMILY GROUP CONFERENCES IN CHILD
WELFARE 42-43 (1998); Jennifer Michelle Cunha, Comment, Family Group Conferences:
Healing the Wounds of Juvenile Property Crime in New Zealand and the United States, 13
EMORY INT'L L. REV. 283, 296-97 (1999); David Moore et al., A New Approach to Juvenile
Justice: An Evaluation of Family Conferencing in Wagga Wagga, available at
http://www.aic.gov.au/rjustice/jjustice/index.html (last modified Feb. 22, 2000).
73. See, e.g., Cunha, supra note 72, at 286. For a detailed examination of the British
model of family group conferencing, see generally MARSH & CROW, supra note 72.
74. See Cunha, supranote 72, at 300.
75. See Umbreit, supra note 71, at 57-58.
76. Cunha, supra note 72, at 302. The "youth advocate" may be the court-appointed
lawyer for the juvenile. Id. at 302 n.87.
77. This is true even though lawyers are not banned from most family group conferences. In New Zealand, where family group conferencing first gained prominence, legisla-
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sit in a circle, and the discussion proceeds by hearing first from
the offender and then from the victim.7" Finally, the group
reaches a disposition through consensus.7 9 In contrast to a traditional court-imposed sentence that relies on the threat of coercion
to ensure that an offender adheres to a non-incarcerative sentence (revocation of probation, for example), a sentence imposed
through the family group conferencing procedure is, by definition,
one that the offender has agreed to and presumably believes is
fair. ° Sentences imposed through family group conferences may
include public apologies, which involve some shaming of the offender.8 '
Studies of various restorative justice programs reveal many
successes."2 There are extremely consistent reports of victim satisfaction with restorative justice experiences. 3 Offenders respond
to restorative justice programs because they perceive them to be
just.' Of course, the social psychology reviewed above provides
reason to be hopeful that these perceptions will translate into
greater voluntary compliance. 5 A limited number of studies indicate that restorative justice processing is associated with lower
reoffending levels, as compared to participants in 8 7control

groups,88 but more work must be done to verify this effect.

What should be obvious here is that restorative justice will not

tion expressly allows lawyers to attend. Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act,
1989, § 251(1)(g) (N.Z.), available at http://rangi.knowledge-basket.co.nz/gpacts/
public/text/l989/se/024se251.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2002).
78. Cunha, supra note 72, at 304-05.
79. Id. at 307.
80. Id. at 316-17. The procedure in New Zealand is that all parties in the family
group conference sentencing circle must agree on the penalty. See JOHN BELGRAVE, NEW
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE ch. 3 (1996), at
OF JUSTICE,
ZEALAND MINISTRY
http'//www.justice.govt.nzlpubs/reports/1996/restorative/chapter3.html (last visited Apr. 5,
2002). If there is no consensus, then the case is referred back to the court. Id.
81. See GABRIELLE M. MAXWELL & ALLISON MORRIS, FAhmLY, VICTIMS AND CULTURE:
YOUTH JUSTICE IN NEW ZEALAND 93 (1993) (noting that penalties imposed by group conferencing may include apologies, community service, victim reparation, work/education
programs, counseling, curfew, fines, removal from current residence, or detention in a juvenile facility); see also Cunha, supra note 72, at 308.
82. See Cunha, supranote 72, at 312-19.
83. See id. at 317-19; see also John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and PessimisticAccounts, 25 CRIME & JUST. 1, 20-26 (1999).
84. Braithwaite, supranote 83, at 26-27.
85. See supra text accompanying note 80.
86. Cunha, supranote 72, at 314-15.
87. See Braithwaite, supra note 83, at 27-30.
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necessarily produce the kind of punishment typically considered
optimal under the standard economic account. The family group
conference requires that the offender's family attend and meet
with the victim's family.88 This means that the offender will not
bear his punishment alone. Even while the conference may expose the offender's family to some shame, their presence simultaneously reaffirms the offender's identity as a person with connections to others.89 Moreover, to the extent that some punishments,
such as public apologies, have public components, third parties
may have incentives to engage in further shaming of the defendant, raising the possibility of the arbitrary sentences that Posner fears.9" However, the procedural justice approach predicts
that people are influenced to a greater extent by the process
through which the punishment is imposed than by the actual
punishment itself.9 Therefore, this approach would suggest that
we need not concern ourselves so much with the variable severity
of shaming punishments.
This argument has limits, of course. The restorative justice approach I have just described, which owes a considerable debt to
John Braithwaite's theorizing in his landmark book, Crime,
9 2 assumes that the punishment experiShame and Reintegration,
enced is not so severe or humiliating that the defendant cannot be
reintegrated into the relevant community after the punishment
because his desire to be reintegrated has evaporated.9 3 Reintegration requires that the suspect's dignity be respected and that the
defendant be otherwise treated in a manner which evidences that
he is a member of the group.94 Some shaming penalties, such as a
public flogging, may be completely inconsistent with these assumptions.
Thus, the normative view of the value of shaming penalties is
highly dependent upon an empirical assessment of the context in
88. See Cunha, supra note 72, at 302.
89. See Erik Luna, Restorative Justice: A New Model of Punishment 12 (Sept. 2000)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author) ("The presence of the juvenile's family
and supporters gives the process credence while ensuring that his positive identities-as a
son, a brother, a soccer player, or a student-are reinforced by the words and presence of
those who care most about the young person.").
90.
91.

See POSNER, supra note 3, at 95.
See supra text accompanying notes 40-43, 51-53.

92.

See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION (1989).

93.
94.

See id. at 55-57.
See id.
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which they are imposed. While Posner also believes that whether
his model supports or rejects shaming penalties ultimately is an
empirical question,95 the questions he asks are different in an important way from those implied by the normative model. 6 These
differences flow from the fact that Posner's model lies behind
standard economic assumptions about optimal penalties." Thus,
the normative model has little disagreement with signaling.98 Instead, the normative model resists the focus on the actual penalties imposed on an offender-at least insofar as the penalties
ought to relate to the offender's opportunity structure-to the exclusion of the process that produces them.99
Process is not all that matters in the normative approach. It
would be incoherent if government authorities could impose any
penalty on an offender so long as the offender was spoken to politely, provided a good lawyer, and convicted in an obviously impartial tribunal with a jury of the defendant's own selection. For
example, it is hard to believe that a universal death penalty for
all felony offenses would be accepted as legitimate by both the
law breakers and the law abiders in a community just because
procedural justice indicia unrelated to the outcome of the process
were observed--especially if members of an out-group are disproportionately punished.
Posner speaks to this problem in his book. Dividing the world
into the politically powerful Xs and the poor and weak Ys, Posner
warns that criminal punishments imposed on the out-group Ys by
the in-group Xs may motivate Ys to engage in even more criminal
behavior-especially when the punishment includes public shaming-in order to signal their solidarity with other Ys.'0° Such behavior is not unknown among youthful street gangs.1"' Posner
concludes that the better approach to punishment of Ys in this
context
is to impose very quiet penalties but no shaming penal02
ties.

95. Compare POSNER, supra note 3, at 106, with id. at 108.
96. See id. at 110-11.
97. See id. at 92.
98. Id. at 111.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 97-99.
101. See id. at 99.
102. Id.
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Posner's discussion of Xs and Ys maps quite easily onto the racial dynamics of criminal punishment in the United States. °3 In
the Chicago study referred to above, 4 psychologist Tom Tyler
examined whether judgments of the legitimacy of legal authorities were affected by racial and class differences.' 5 He found that
among samples of white versus minority, or rich versus poor Chicago residents, all of these groups were equally likely to say that
government authorities had the right to dictate proper behavior
and that laws ought to be obeyed, even if they disagreed with
them.' 6 However, when these same groups were asked about
their personal experience with legal authorities, minority or poor
residents were more likely to report experiencing injustice.' 7 The
theories of legitimacy canvassed above suggest that people who
believe that one ought to obey legal authorities and accept the decisions of authorities about how to resolve problems or how to restrict one's behavior will feel an internalized obligation to comply
with the law. Yet, the findings that minorities and poor people often experience injustice would seemingly undercut such
compli08
ance effects, perhaps in the way that Posner describes.
The studies are not conclusive, but they suggest that when authorities pay attention to procedural justice indicia, they create a
"cushion of support" against contrary reactions when unfavorable
outcomes are delivered.0 9 Distributive justice matters too, which
might also undercut Posner's analysis. Posner suggests that the
danger of subcommunity defiance militates against public shaming penalties and in support of quieter punishments such as imprisonment."' Nevertheless, the inescapable problem is that even
quiet punishments are known. Whether African-Americans are
publicly shamed or quietly warehoused in rural prisons, it is
common knowledge that the rates of punishment within the
group are quite high."' This knowledge leads to the stigmatization of racial minorities who are neither branded with scarlet let103. See id. at 98.
104. See supranotes 25-26 and accompanying text.
105. See TYLER, supra note 16, at 57-65; see also TOM R. TYLER ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE
IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 144-47 (1997).
106. TYLER ETAL., supranote 105, at 145 tbl.6.1, 146 tbl.6.2.
107. Id. at 146 tbl.6.2.
108. See POSNER, supra note 3, at 100.
109. See TYLER, supranote 16, at 107.
110. POSNER, supra note 3, at 99.
111. See, e.g., id. at 99-100.
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ters nor locked behind bars, but, instead, are simply walking
down the street." 2 While perceptions of distributive justice may
have negative consequences for compliance," 3 procedural justice
indicia appear to act as a counterbalance. Standard theories of
optimal criminal punishments do not reveal these nuances.
IV. CONCLUSION
Eric Posner's Law and Social Norms is a valuable contribution
to literature for those who think about informal social control. By
providing an account of why people engage in some types of
nonlegal sanctioning behavior, Posner's work helpfully advances
theories of normative compliance with the law. However, because
he does not disengage his theory from the standard economic conception of optimal criminal punishment, the theory does not prescribe much helpful criminal law policy where it is most neededaddressing the racial dynamics of criminal punishment and crime
reduction in high-crime neighborhoods. In these arenas, the real
questions should be whether and how less powerful groups can be
punished at all, consistent with the dictates of legitimacy. I have
explored the contingencies of this question. Much depends on the
extent of the crime problem that the disadvantaged group experiences, which in turn will necessitate some kind of state intervention to help the community deal with the problem. The extent to
which the governed group can hold law enforcers accountable to
them also matters a great deal; and, the distributional effect that
punishment has on the life-chances of those who reside in the
community, such that the community's social organizational
structure is compromised, is yet another factor. While each one of
these factors importantly depends on the cooperative relationships that individuals form with one another, it is not immediately obvious that the signaling model helps to solve the vexing
problem of generating justice in the process of criminal punishment among racial minorities in this country.

112. See Meares, Place and Crime, supra note 1, at 680 (referring to widespread imprisonment of African-Americans as a "race-making" factor).
113. See TYLER, supra note 16, at 108.

